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Introduction
It’s Election Night 2016.1 Brian Williams stands by at NBC, waiting 
to give the first returns of the night. “Kentucky to Christie,” Williams tri-
umphantly announces to kick off the evening’s festivities. Kentucky turns 
flush red on NBC’s virtual election map. Williams continues: “Maryland to 
Clinton.” Now comes the hard part for Williams. Clinton won Maryland 
by an incredible two-to-one margin. NBC viewers intently watch the map, 
expecting to see the Old Line State turn blue. Instead, Maryland sits idly in 
its static grey color. This election has something new.
Confused NBC viewers keep watching, waiting for Williams to 
provide an explanation. “We’d love to tell you who will win Maryland 
now, but unfortunately we can’t,” Williams says. “We’ll have to wait 
until all votes nationwide have been counted.” Realizing that many of 
his viewers are likely perplexed by this new electoral voting system, 
Williams starts explaining the newly enacted National Popular Vote 
Interstate Compact (NPVC), in which several states have agreed to 
1 This hypothetical scenario is for illustrative purposes only.
* J.D. Candidate, George Mason University School of Law, 2013; B.A. Journalism, University of 
Maryland, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Ilya Somin for his assistance with this article.
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allocate their Electoral College delegates to the winner of the national 
vote, as opposed to the traditional state vote.
Debate about the Electoral College has raged through the years, 
but it came to the forefront of national political attention after the 2000 
presidential election produced the fourth electoral “misfire” in United 
States history.2 In 2001, law professors Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram 
David Amar introduced the idea of state legislatures allocating their 
respective electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote.3 
Five years later, the organization “National Popular Vote,” consisting of 
a bipartisan group of prominent current and former congressmen, held 
its initial press conference in Washington, D.C. to explain the legislation 
that would soon be introduced in all 50 U.S. states.4 National Popular 
Vote introduced the NPVC, which, if adopted by enough states, would 
essentially replace the constitutionally mandated Electoral College 
with a direct national popular vote.5 Significantly, this law would be 
enacted by a horizontal agreement among the states, not a constitutional 
amendment.6 At the time of this writing, California, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington, and the 
District of Columbia have enacted the National Popular Vote Compact 
(NPVC).7 Cumulatively, these jurisdictions equal 132 of the necessary 
270 electoral votes for the NPVC’s provisions to go into effect.8
2 A “misfire” refers to an election in which the presidential candidate who won the most popular 
votes failed to win the presidency. There have been four such elections (1824, 1876, 1888, and 
2000). Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils 
of Sub-Constitutional Change, 100 Geo. L.J. 173 at 196 (2011). 
3 Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President 
Without Amending the Constitution, FindLaw (Dec. 28, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
amar/20011228.html.
4 Prepared Remarks from Press Conference, Nat’l Popular Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.
com/pages/releases/20060223.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
5 Id.
6 See id.
7 Cal Elec. Code § 6920 (West 2012); D.C. Code § 1-1051.01 (West 2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 14D-1 
(West 2008); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-5A-01 (West 2011); 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/5 (West 2011); 
2010 Mass. Acts Ch. 229; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011); 2011 Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 17, §§ 2751-
2755 (West 2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.56.300 (West 2011).
8 A candidate must receive 270 out of a possible 538 electoral votes in order to win the Electoral College. 
Office of the Fed. Reg., A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/procedural_guide.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). This number is derived 
from the combination of three different sources. First, the U.S. Census figures determine the number of 
congressional representatives each state can have. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (West 2011). Second, 3 U.S.C. § 3 (West 
2011) states that “[t]he number of electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives 
to which the several States are by law entitled at the time when the President and Vice President to be 
chosen come into office.” Third, the Twenty-Third Amendment of the Constitution grants presidential 
electors to the District of Columbia, but no more than the least populous state. U.S. Const. amend. XXIII. 
Article IV of the NPVC states that “[t]his agreement shall take effect when states cumulatively possessing 
a majority of the electoral votes have enacted this agreement in substantially the same form and the 
enactments by such states have taken effect in each state.”). 888-Word Interstate Compact, Nat’l Popular 
Vote, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2012) [hereinafter National Popular vote Compact]. 
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If the NPVC is triggered and becomes binding law, the chief election 
official in each member state will add up the total number of national 
popular votes for each candidate, and the state’s certifying official will 
then appoint that state’s slate of electoral votes to the winner of the 
national popular vote.9 Member states are permitted to withdraw from 
the NPVC, but cannot do so after July 20th in the year of a presiden-
tial election.10 As this article will later explain, each state is entitled to 
choose how it wants to allocate its electoral votes. Thus, constitutional 
scrutiny of the NPVC centers on the manner in which it will be enacted, 
not whether each state has the individual power to change its method 
of electoral vote allocation.
Part II of this article will discuss the formation of the Electoral 
College, the roles that both state and federal governments play in the 
election of the President, and the emergence of the NPVC as an alter-
native to a constitutional amendment. Part III surveys the history of 
the Compact Clause, which would be implicated by enactment of the 
NPVC. Part IV then takes a detailed look at the principles of federalism 
that are inherent in the Electoral College, explores the roles of presi-
dential electors, and concludes that under existing Compact Clause 
precedent, the NPVC does not require Congressional consent in order 
for it to be effective.
II. Electoral College Background
Article II of the Constitution requires each state legislature to define 
a method to appoint electors to vote for the President.11 In McPherson 
v. Blacker, a late nineteenth century case, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that state legislatures have this plenary power under Article II when it 
upheld the Michigan legislature’s proposal to establish a district-based 
voting system.12 McPherson affirmed the principle that the Constitution 
does not require any particular legislative scheme for appointing presi-
dential electors.13 The Court has said that this power is so exclusively 
vested within state legislatures that “the text of the election law itself, 
9 National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
10 The NPVC states that it “shall govern the appointment of presidential electors in each member 
state in any year in which this agreement is, on July 20, in effect in states cumulatively possessing a 
majority of the electoral votes.” Id.
11 U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to 
which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”).
12 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (“[The Constitution] recognizes that the people act 
through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define 
the method of effecting the object.”).
13 Id. 
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and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on inde-
pendent significance.”14
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates considered several 
methods of presidential selection: (1) popular election, (2) election 
by state legislatures, (3) election by special electors, and (4) election 
by the national legislature (Congress).15 George Mason scoffed at the 
idea of having people directly vote for the president, saying “it would 
be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief 
Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours [sic] to 
a blind man.”16 Charles Pinckney, another delegate, feared that under 
a direct vote, the populous states would be able to control the outcome 
of presidential elections to the detriment of smaller states.17 However, 
Pinckney believed this method was the most effective for the selection 
of the president, as the legislature would “be most attentive to the 
choice of a fit man to carry [the laws passed by the legislature] properly 
into execution.”18 Gouverneur Morris thought Pinckney’s fears were 
exaggerated, and ensured delegates that even though groups of vot-
ers might control the popular will in small districts, “the general voice 
of the State is never influenced by such artifices.”19 While the people 
might not have known of all activity in Washington, Morris thought 
they would know of those “great and illustrious characters which have 
merited their esteem & confidence.”20
James Wilson, James Madison, and Morris favored a direct national 
vote by the people.21 The delegates to the Convention had originally 
decided that Congress would elect the president, but Morris expressed 
his opposition to that plan, explaining that the president might turn out 
to be a puppet of the legislature, leading to “[c]abal and corruption.”22 
Madison initially saw no problem with a direct national vote, as he felt 
14 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000); accord Bradley T. Turflinger, Fifty Republics and the 
National Popular vote: How the Guarantee Clause Should Protect States Striving for Equal Protection in 
Presidential Elections, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 793, 825 (2011). 
15 James Madison, Notes Of Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787 308 (Adrienne Koch 
ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1976). Thomas Paine had a unique proposal that was never discussed during 
the Convention—that the delegates from the colonies select the president by lot. Lolabel House, 
A Study of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 1 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Philadelphia).





21 Neal R. Peirce & Lawrence D. Longley, The People’s President: The Electoral College in 
America and the Direct Vote Alternative 21 (Murray Printing Co. 1981).
22 Madison, supra note 15, at 525.
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that “the President [was] to act for the people, not the States.”23 Wilson 
introduced the idea that each state send electors to convene and cast 
their vote for president in accordance with the popular will of their 
respective states.24 This feature, Wilson argued, would prevent state 
intervention in the electoral process and “would produce more confi-
dence among the people.”25 A direct national election would diminish 
the southern states’ voting power because slaves were represented 
as three-fifths of a person for census purposes, but had no concomi-
tant suffrage rights.26 The resulting Electoral College compromise 
gave each state a number of delegates equal to the number of its 
Congressional representatives.27
In 1788, Congress determined that each state would appoint 
presidential electors on the first Wednesday in January of 1789.28 The 
Framers projected that the states would use the district system when 
deciding how to allocate electors,29 but a complete lack of uniformity 
quickly developed for the first presidential election.30 The legislatures 
of Georgia, South Carolina, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware 
each appointed electors without referencing the citizens of their 
respective states in any way.31 The Massachusetts legislature appointed 
two at-large electors on its own, and used a district-based system to 
allow the people to choose the state’s other electors.32 Maryland and 
Virginia each used a district-based system, whereas New Hampshire 
and Pennsylvania allowed their citizens to select electors on a general 
ticket.33 New York cast no votes, as its legislature’s two houses could 
not agree on how to appoint electors.34 For the second presidential elec-
tion in 1792, nine state legislatures decided that they would themselves 
appoint electors.35 Four states used either a district system or general 
23 Id. at 524-25 (emphasis added). Eldridge Gerry, though, feared that “one set of men dispersed 
through the Union & acting in Concert” would always be able to determine the president, as they 
could override “[t]he ignorance of the people” under a direct national vote. Id. at 50. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.
26 Peirce & Longley, supra note 21 (1981). If each state’s vote totals were counted separately and 
independent of one another, southern states could reap the benefit of having increased state 
citizenship, and thus increased voting power, without having to grant slaves the right to vote. Paul 
Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins Of The Electoral College, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1145, 1154–55 (2002).
27 This figure would include the number of representatives in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. See Robert M. Hardaway, The Electoral College and the Constitution: The 
Case for Preserving Federalism 82 (Praeger Publishers 1994).
28 34 Journals of the Continental Congress 613 (Sept. 13, 1788).
29 Letter from James Madison to George Hay Montpellier (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 Max 
Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention Of 1787 459 (Yale Univ. Press 1911).




34 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892). 
35 Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 34.
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ticket, while New Hampshire and Massachusetts used a system in 
which the selection of electors would be shared between the legislature 
and the people.36
In 1796, only six out of sixteen states used either the district system 
or general ticket.37 That year’s presidential election saw the emergence 
of political parties, as Federalist members of Congress caucused to 
nominate John Adams as the party’s candidate to succeed George 
Washington, while Republican party members organized to nominate 
Thomas Jefferson.38 The rise of political parties incentivized the party 
in control of the state legislatures to act strategically at the time of each 
presidential election.39 For the first several elections in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, some state legislatures would 
often make abrupt changes to their method of allocation, such as vest-
ing within themselves the power to appoint and taking away that away 
from the citizens.40 For example, on the night before a statewide election, 
the Federalist New Jersey legislature, realizing that the election would 
not produce the winner it wanted, repealed a state law that called for 
the allocation of delegates based on a statewide popular vote.41
In 1818, New Jersey Senator Mahlon Dickerson advocated for uni-
formity in the election of the president.42 On the Senate floor, Dickerson 
recognized the dangers of unpredictability: “[the electoral systems] are 
the subjects of constant fluctuation and change—of frequent, hasty, 
and rash, experiment—established, altered, abolished, re-established, 
according to the dictates of the interest, the ambition, the whim, or 
caprice, of party and faction.”43 However, Dickerson conceded that the 
lack of uniformity among the states would only be acceptable if each 
state made its method permanent.”44 State legislatures slowly caught on 
to the general ticket system, and by 1836, South Carolina was the lone 
state that had not adopted it.45 Unlike the district system, which might 
allow a minority party to pick up some electoral votes, the general 
ticket and its “winner-take-all” format gave the ruling political party 
of each state the ability to deliver its entire state to the party’s national 





40 Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 45.
41 Id.
42 31 Annals of Cong. 178 (1818).
43 Id. at 181.
44 Id. at 179–80. 
45 Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 46.
46 Id. at 46–47.
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not use the winner-take-all system, as each of those states allocates its 
electoral votes based on the district method.47
Wilson’s idea of having representative electors was projected 
as something far different than what it quickly became in practice. 
Alexander Hamilton liked the idea of the states delegating a select 
group of electors to represent their state.48 These electors, Hamilton 
thought, would produce a better and more informed decision than the 
people themselves.49 Because the electors would not formally convene 
together, but vote only within their respective states, they would be less 
exposed to the “heats and ferments” of being in the physical presence of 
each other.50 Hamilton also believed that, because the electors and the 
state legislatures’ appointing them were among the “enlightened and 
respectable citizens,” the electors would naturally direct towards the 
most accomplished candidate for the presidency.51 However, with the 
introduction of political parties, Hamilton’s vision that the delegates 
would provide a free, unconstrained choice quickly disappeared.52 
Instead, “party discipline” was seen as a way of avoiding an executive 
branch that had a president and vice president from different parties.53 
This rigorous discipline was partly responsible for the result of the 
1796 presidential election, which produced John Adams, a Federalist, 
as president, and Thomas Jefferson, a Republican, as vice president.54
For decades, a number of constitutional amendments have been 
proposed to change the presidential election to a straight national pop-
ular vote.55 A 2007 poll assembled by the Washington Post, Kaiser Family 
Foundation, and Harvard University showed 72% public support for 
a national popular vote to determine the winner of the presidential 
election.56 But support for a shift to a national popular vote is nothing 
new, as polls have shown 65% of Americans approving of a change to a 
direct national vote as early as 1944.57 The NPVC is one of the latest and 
most successful attempts to prevent the College from producing such 
a misfire. In both 1969 and 1979, proposed constitutional amendments 
47 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 802, 805(2) (West 2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-714, 32-1038(1) 
(2011).




52 John R. Koza, et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan For Electing the President by 
Popular Vote 43–44 (3d ed. Nat’l Popular Vote Press 2011).
53 Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just Below the 
Surface in Choosing The President, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 121, 128 (2006). 
54 Id. 
55 See Koza, supra note 52, at 95–131 (providing detailed explanations of previously attempted 
amendments).
56 Id. at 276.
57 Id. at 275 (citing a Gallup News Service poll showing that popular support for a direct national 
vote got as high as 81% after the 1968 presidential election). 
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to scrap the Electoral College in favor of a direct popular vote failed to 
earn the necessary two-thirds vote from the Senate.58 Since then, how-
ever, no Congressional proposals to move towards a national popular 
vote have had any success.59
III. The Compact Clause: A Rarely Implicated  
and Wide-Open Provision
Among the constitutional provisions likely to be in play in poten-
tial litigation concerning the NPVC is the seldom-invoked Compact 
Clause.60 In Article I, Section 10, clause 3, of the Constitution, the 
Compact Clause is among several restrictions, all of which require 
states to obtain some form of Congressional consent:
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty 
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in 
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”61
Congressional consent is the federal government’s check on the 
otherwise free market for states to collude on legislative matters.62 
The manner in which Congress must assent to approval of interstate 
compacts was initially unclear.63 Justice Story explained that express 
congressional consent would leave no doubts as to a compact’s validity 
and that implied consent was possible, but provided minimal elabora-
tion of what was required for the implication of congressional consent.64 
Story seemed less concerned with the effects that compacts might have 
on non-compacting states than with the possibility that they might 
infringe upon the powers of the national government.65 He classified 
compacts as applying to issues pertaining to “mere private rights of 
sovereignty; such as questions of boundary; interests in land situated in 
58 Williams, supra note 2, at 185.
59 Id.
60 The Equal Protection Clause is also likely to be implicated. See Williams, supra note 2, at 226–28.
61 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
62 See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate Relations: The Neglected Dimension of Federalism 
36 (Greenwood Publ’g Group, Inc. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the congressional 
consent requirement is to protect the Union by controlling collective actions of states.”). See also 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 496 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“As the 
constitutional arbiter of political differences between States, the Congress is the proper body to 
evaluate the extent of harm being imposed on non-Compact States, and to impose ameliorative 
restrictions as might be necessary.”).
63 See generally Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
64 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 311 (Boston, Hilliard, 
Gray & Co. 1833). 
65 Id. at 310.
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the territory of each other; and other internal regulations for the mutual 
comfort and convenience of states, bordering on each other.”66
Functionally, compacts have taken on a role similar to legislation, 
meaning that presidents have veto power.67 Both individuals and states 
can seek relief in state and federal court to prevent the obligations of 
a compact from coming into effect.68 Federal courts could interpret 
compacts under state law only until 1981, when the Supreme Court 
said that Congress’ consent to a compact gave it the force of federal 
law.69 When compacting parties reach an agreement on a compact, they 
must then seek approval from each of the respective state legislatures.70 
Initially, governors appointed joint commissions to draft interstate 
compacts.71 Since 1930 though, standards have been relaxed regarding 
who can be a party to compact negotiations and whether compacting 
individuals are required to have authorization to act on behalf of their 
respective state legislatures.72
The Compact Clause has its roots in the colonial era, when the colo-
nies set up joint commissions to deal with boundary disputes.73 These 
disputes developed as populations within each colony crept up on other 
colonies, and disputes emerged over the control of Atlantic seaboard 
territory.74 When making agreements among themselves, the colonies 
were required to gain approval of the Crown after they negotiated settle-
ments.75 If the colonies could not come to an agreement, their method of 
recourse was an appeal to the Crown, with appellate remedies available 
in the Privy Council.76 After the American Revolution, the drafters of the 
Articles of Confederation, aware of the potentially destructive nature 
of boundary disputes and their potential to weaken the young union, 
included language in the Articles to assure that the national government 
66 Id.
67 For example, in 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the Republican River Compact, 
believing that it encroached on national interests in appropriating water. 88 Cong. Rec. 3285–86 (1942). 
68 See Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 39 (“Although the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen of 
one state to sue another state without its consent, a citizen can challenge a compact or its execution 
in a state or national court against an individual or in a proceeding to prevent a government officer 
from enforcing a compact.” (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
69 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (“But where Congress has authorized the States to enter into 
a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject 
for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal 
law under the Compact Clause.”).
70 See Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 35.
71 Id. at 34.
72 Id. at 34–35 (referencing the Interstate Commission on Crime and regional governors’ 
conferences as examples of how some compacts are now formed through “ad hoc arrangements”). 
73 Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution– A Study in Interstate 
Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 692 (1925).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 754–55 appx. B (citing the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Settlement of 1740).
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had control in the remedying of interstate disputes.77 Congressional 
consent was established as a requirement for interstate disputes, as the 
main concern was that states might “split the confederacy” by way of 
an agreement.78 Maryland and Virginia entered into one such compact 
under the Articles, as the two states formed an agreement to establish 
navigation and fishing rights on the Potomac River.79
Interstate compacts remained permissible under the Constitution, 
but states could no longer make treaties or alliances with other states 
or nations.80 As Michael Greve explains, the “broad and unqualified” lan-
guage in the Compact Clause and the other Article I, Section 10 restrictions 
on the States reflects “the Founders’ special concern over all-not just 
some—state agreements.”81 The Compact Clause’s placement in Article 
I, Section 10 of the Constitution is highly relevant to a determination of 
the Framers’ original intent with the Clause, as it sits alongside numer-
ous other powers prohibited to the States.82 The Federalist is fairly sparse 
in its discussion of the Compact Clause, lumping it in with a discus-
sion of a number of other clauses that were “copied” from the Articles 
of Confederation.83 However, Greve views its placement in Article I, 
Section 10 as the Framers’ expression of the “Madisonian negative.”84 
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison had advocated for 
a national veto power over all state legislation.85 Madison wanted the 
national government to retain a supervisory role over the states and 
prevent them from encroaching on federal prerogatives.86 While other 
delegates at the Convention rejected the extreme nature of the proposal, 
they agreed with Madison that a “certain species of state laws” needed 
to have some form of federal check.87 Specifically, the Framers feared 
giving states the exclusive control to handle debtor relief laws, import 
duties, and the printing of money.88 Along with the other prohibitions 
77 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VI, para. 2 (“No two or more States shall enter into any 
treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united States 
in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered 
into, and how long it shall continue.”). Congressional consent under the Articles of Confederation 
was different in that the congressional body itself was different-a unicameral one instead of the 
bicameral one that is in place today. Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 33.
78 Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 33.
79 Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 163–165 (1894). The Court also explained that even though the 
compact was entered into before the Constitution, it was still valid, as it did not conflict in any way 
with the Constitution. Id. at 167–68.
80 Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular vote Interstate Compact, 6 Election 
L.J. 372, 379 (2007).
81 Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 285, 297–98 (2003).
82 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
83 The Federalist No. 44, at 277, 280 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
84 Greve, supra note 81, at 313.
85 Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 649 (1999).
86 Id.
87 Greve, supra note 81, at 313.
88 Id.
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in Article I, Section 10, compacts were treated as part of a “clas[s] of 
state laws with a manifest detrimental effect on sister states.”89
Compact Clause case law is sparse, but the Supreme Court has 
provided a broad framework for which Compact Clause questions are 
to be addressed. One of the early leading cases on the Compact Clause 
did not concern the Compact Clause at all.90 In Holmes v. Jennison,91 
Chief Justice Taney explained that the governor of Vermont did not 
have the authority to enter into an informal agreement with Canadian 
authorities to deliver a Canadian citizen who had been arrested in 
Vermont.92 Fearing that individual states could gain the power of decid-
ing their own exclusive conditions on which to negotiate with foreign 
countries,93 Taney realized that to allow the states to form agreements 
in this manner would infringe on the federal government’s exclusive 
treaty-making power.94 However, Taney did not determine that the 
agreement was flat out impermissible, but that it had to be “made under 
the supervision of the United States,” thus giving some meaning to the 
congressional consent requirement in the Constitution.95 Though the 
agreement at issue in Holmes addressed an agreement between a state 
and a foreign country, not one between states, scholarship suggests 
that the same principles apply to the federal government’s supervisory 
interest in either instance.96
Fourteen years later, in Florida v. Georgia,97 Taney clarified that the 
vertical protection established in Holmes was to be evaluated by way of 
a horizontal component. Taney explained that the Compact Clause’s 
purpose was to protect the interests of the non-compacting states.98 
89 Id. (“Uniformly, the prohibitions and negatives are directed against classes of state laws with a 
manifest detrimental effect on sister states. As Madison might have put it, the Convention sought 
to arrest factionalism at the borders.”). See also, Gillian Metzger, Congress, Article Iv, and Interstate 
Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1500–01 (2007) (“What nonetheless remains notable about 
Section 10 is that it represents an express articulation of the interstate model also evident in the 
other constitutional interstate provisions--that is, prohibitions on the states that are independently 
binding but subject to ultimate congressional control.”).
90 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 578 (1840) (plurality opinion).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 578.
93 Id. (“Such conflicting exercises of the same power would not be well calculated to preserve 
respect abroad or union at home.”).
94 Id.
95 Holmes, 39 U.S. at 578. See also Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185, 209 (1837) (“If Congress consented, 
then the states were in this respect restored to their original inherent sovereignty; such consent 
being the sole limitation imposed by the constitution . . . .”).
96 Greve, supra note 81, at 298 (“The text of the Clause, of course, treats state agreements with 
foreign powers on a par with state-to-state agreements. If it compels a rigid interpretation in 
the foreign dimension, it compels an equally rigid, forbidding interpretation in its domestic 
dimension.”).
97 Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 494 (1854).
98 Id. (“This provision is obviously intended to guard the rights and interests of the other States, 
and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously 
the interest of the others.”).
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He reasoned that even though the dispute rested between Florida and 
Georgia, every other state in the Union had an interest in the dispute, 
and their collective interests were represented by the United States as a 
whole.99 After this case, it appeared as though the constitutionality of a 
compact was to be determined by way of a horizontal component (i.e., 
potential effects on other states) if it did not concern a power in which 
the federal government’s power was undisputedly supreme.
The more “modern” view of the Compact Clause emerged in the 
dictum of virginia v. Tennessee, another land dispute case.100 Though 
his Compact Clause scrutiny was not necessary,101 Justice Field’s analy-
sis in that case has been viewed as the turning point in the Supreme 
Court’s Compact Clause jurisprudence.102 Specifically, Justice Field 
said that the Compact Clause prohibited “any combination tending 
to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach 
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”103 
Justice Field’s application of his seemingly profound analysis boiled 
down to his determination that the states were simply making formal 
determinations on “that which actually existed before,”104 and thus nei-
ther state changed its relation to the federal government in a way that 
would deem the agreement unconstitutional.105
In U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission,106 the Court entertained 
its most significant and most recent application of the Compact Clause. 
Affirming Justice Field’s dictum as binding constitutional law under the 
Compact Clause,107 the Court looked at the Multistate Tax Commission, 
which was composed of the member states’ respective tax administra-
tors.108 The Commission conducted mostly advisory work in its “rec-
ognition that, as applied to multistate businesses, traditional state tax 
administration was inefficient and costly to both State and taxpayer.”109 
The Commission established uniform administrative regulations that 
would not be binding until a given state adopted it “in accordance with 
99 Id. 
100 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). The Court also used this case as an opportunity 
to clear up the distinction between compacts and agreements, explaining that it “d[id] not perceive 
any difference in the meaning, except that the word ‘compact’ is generally used with reference to 
more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term ‘agreement.’”). Id. at 520.
101 Id. at 525.
102 See Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 Akron L. Rev. 717, 732–33 (2007).
103 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
104 Id. at 520.
105 Id. at 520–21.
106 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
107 Id. at 471.
108 Id. at 456. 
109 Id.
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its own law.”110 Another provision allowed the Commission to conduct 
audits for member states and to use compulsory process in the courts 
of member states.111 The states that formed the Commission had uni-
lateral exit rights from the compact, and could exercise those rights by 
enacting a repealing statute.112 In concluding that the compact at stake 
did not require congressional consent, the Court determined that the 
member states were not collectively creating a new power that they did 
not already have individually.113
Though much of the majority opinion in U.S. Steel did not articulate 
the circumstances that would need to occur in order for the Compact 
Clause to be violated, the Court opened up the possibility that such a 
circumstance might be present if the Commission had definite author-
ity to impose punishments.114 The Court explained that the compact 
granted the Commission, in its auditing capacity, the power to require 
individual attendance and production of documents.115 But because the 
procedure for enforcing that requirement would have to be conducted 
in the same manner as it would if acted upon by a random auditing 
agent, the Court concluded that the Commission had no exclusive 
punishing power and thus was not providing the member states with 
a benefit that they did not already have.116 After U.S. Steel, the constitu-
tionality of an interstate compact boils down to two either/or elements: 
(1) does the compact encroach on federal supremacy, or (2) does it 
encroach on the sovereignty of other states?117
IV. The NPVC Should Survive A Mechanical  
Application Of Existing Compact Clause Precedent
A. U.S. Steel’s magical footnote
If opponents of the NPVC claim U.S. Steel as the guiding light for 
a constitutional challenge to the NPVC, they may as well concede 
defeat. Unless the Compact Clause is broader than U.S. Steel purports 
it to be, the NPVC does not require Congressional consent, because 
it impinges only on a federal interest, not an area where the federal 
110 Id. However, the signatories “retain[ed] complete control over all legislation and administrative 
action affecting the rate of tax, the composition of the tax base (including the determination of 
the components of taxable income), and the means and methods of determining tax liability and 





115 U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 475. 
116 Id.
117 Id. at 471.
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government has any supreme power.118 Footnote 33 in the U.S. Steel 
opinion acknowledges that every interstate agreement in some way 
implicates a federal interest.119 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
conceded that the Multistate Tax Compact presented a federal concern, 
but that “federal interest” was an over-inclusive standard, explicitly 
stating that “[t]he dissent appear[ed] to confuse potential impact on 
‘federal interests’ with threats to ‘federal supremacy.’”120 Thus, if a 
compact implicates a federal interest, it does not necessarily follow 
that federal supremacy has also been implicated.121 Justice Powell’s 
footnote acknowledged this distinction, finding that the Multistate Tax 
Compact allowed states to have “[e]nhanced capacity to lobby within 
the federal legislative process,” but that none of the compacting states 
encroached or interfered with federal power, which “in the relevant 
areas remain[ed] plenary.”122
An area of federal supremacy has been infringed by the NPVC 
only if as a consequence of the legislation’s enactment, the compact-
ing states touch on an area that the federal government has deemed to 
be within its exclusive jurisdiction.123 The Framers, however, seldom 
discussed the vertical relationship between state governments and 
national governments in the selection of the president, as it seemed 
implicit that the procedure would be conducted wholly by the states, 
with a federal stamp of approval only for the final tally.124 Alexander 
Hamilton acknowledged that presidential elections were to be con-
ducted in each state, with the federal government—specifically, the 
House of Representatives—stepping in only in the event that a candi-
date failed to receive a majority of the electoral votes.125 The U.S. Steel 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the creation of the Multistate Tax 
Commission impacted both foreign affairs and interstate commerce, 
each of which were under the federal government’s plenary control.126 
However, unlike in U.S. Steel, where the plaintiffs could cite to specific 
Constitutional provisions that they believed had been violated, NPVC 
opponents have very little authority to rely on.
118 See Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent? 42 
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 511, 535–44 (2009) (discussing alternative modes of Compact Clause 
interpretation post-U.S. Steel).




123 For example, the federal government would not want states to create or interfere with national 
foreign policy. See Paul Brest, et. al. Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, Fifth Edition 
(2011 Supplement) 121 (Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 2011).
124 The Federalist No. 68, supra note 48, at 412.
125 Id.
126 Brief for Appellants at 35–44, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) 
(No. 76-635), 1977 WL 189135.
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While various statutes enforce the minimal powers that Congress 
has over elections,127 NPVC opponents are left with little support for 
arguing that that the NPVC encroaches on an area of distinct federal 
supremacy. Accordingly, NPVC opponents will have to craft an argument 
that the first prong of U.S. Steel applies broadly to all federal interests, 
not just to specific constitutional provisions in which Congress has 
plenary constitutional authority.128 NPVC opponents will have to work 
against a slew of lower court opinions that have failed to find compacts 
to have encroached on federal supremacy.129 Challenges to the NPVC 
under the federal supremacy prong of the U.S. Steel test could be sup-
ported by Supreme Court language that suggests that Electoral College 
delegates assume a federal responsibility when they cast their votes.130 
However, the electors receive their authority to vote only from the state 
legislature, and thus to truly implicate a matter of federal supremacy, 
a litigant would have to argue that the electors become federal officers 
when they are appointed.131
Since deciding in McPherson that states were firmly vested with 
the power to choose how to allocate electors,132 the Supreme Court has 
only further bolstered a state’s plenary power to choose its electors, by 
saying that the federal government plays only two roles in the selec-
tion of the president: it can choose (1) when elections are held, and (2) 
when the state’s pledged electors can vote.133 Presidential electors vote 
wholly within their respective states; the list of whom they vote for is 
then directed to the President of the Senate, who counts the votes.134 
Congress’s other Article II role in the election process gives it the power 
127 See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2011) (explaining the procedures for elector controversies).
128 Justice White explained in his U.S. Steel dissent how he thought the Compact Clause 
contemplated a broader notion of what federal supremacy meant for scrutinizing a compact. U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 489–90 (1978).
129 For examples of cases that nicely articulate the failure of the first prong of the U.S. Steel test, 
see Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 360 (4th Cir. 2002) (determining that the Master 
Settlement Agreement did not abridge the federal government’s power to regulate tobacco, 
as specific sections of the agreement allowed for flexible adjustments if future congressional 
regulation were to be passed); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining 
that an interstate compact dealing with the placement of foster children “focus[ed] wholly on 
adoption and foster care of children-areas of jurisdiction historically retained by the states”); 
New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F.Supp. 162, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that 
an interstate compact to regulate airline advertising was valid because states had concurrent 
jurisdiction with Congress in such regulation). 
130 See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (“While presidential electors 
are not officers or agents of the federal government, they exercise federal functions under, and 
discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.”) 
(internal citations omitted).
131 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952) (“[The electors] act by authority of the state that in turn 
receives its authority from the federal constitution.”). 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 14. 
133 See Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890).
134 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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to determine when elections will be held.135 A third prong of congres-
sional control can exist, as the House of Representatives would elect 
the president by a majority vote in the event that the electors cannot 
reach a majority.136 But a reading of the NPVC’s text makes it difficult to 
see any provision by which the federal government can claim supreme 
power over the election for president.137 Thus, the second prong of the 
U.S. Steel test is where the meat of the debate must be.
B. The NPVC does not detract from states  
who wish not to sign on.
The NPVC passes constitutional muster under the Compact Clause 
because the only extraneous element that the NPVC guarantees is that 
member states will have a security blanket in enacting their preferred 
method of delegate allocation.138 The NPVC assures that it satisfies the 
dispositive legal principle at work in U.S. Steel—that is, whether the 
states collectively are creating a power that they did not already have 
individually.139 Neither side of the NPVC debate argues that the states 
do not already possess this plenary power to individually allocate their 
pledged delegates to the winner of the national election; some even 
point to the potentially absurd methods in which a state could allocate 
its delegates, like Rhode Island’s allocating its electors the winner of 
the election in Vermont.140 The question is whether the states are creat-
ing a new power in doing it collectively, or if they are constructively 
legislating for non-member states by effectively nullifying that state’s 
decision to allocate votes in a certain manner. 141
135 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
136 U.S. Const. amend. XII.
137 See National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
138 Justice White’s dissent in U.S. Steel explained that every time a compact is formed, it effectively 
creates a new power for the compacting states.
[T]he very creation of the Compact sets it apart from separate state action. The 
Compact did not become effective in any of the ratifying States until at least seven 
States had adopted it. Thus, unlike reciprocal legislation, the Compact provided 
a means by which a State could assure itself that a certain number of other States 
would go along before committing itself to an apportionment formula.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 493 (White, J., dissenting). 
The U.S. Steel majority may not have disputed Justice White’s point, because the Court 
was focused mainly on whether the Compact created new powers for the States, not 
if it was simply a means of assuring that it could get the desired effect out of powers 
they already had. If Justice White’s articulation of the law is truly the standard, and not 
subsumed within the majority’s new power analysis, then the NPVC might be evaluated 
differently. 
139 Id. at 475–76.
140 Tara Ross, Federalism & Separation of Powers: Legal and Logistical Ramifications of the National 
Popular vote Plan, 11 Engage 2, 40 (Sept. 2010).
141 Kristin Feeney, Guaranteeing A Federally Elected President, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1427, 1451 n.131 
(2009) (arguing that even though non-signatory states are not being forced to adopt the NPVC, 
other states are nullifying their electoral choices and “practically legislat[ing] for them.”).
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The interstate coordination required for the enactment of the NPVC 
is akin to an assurance game. 142 While the “we can do this unilater-
ally, so doing it collectively shouldn’t matter” argument is plausible, it 
becomes somewhat flawed when picked apart. A state would have no 
incentive to allocate its electors to the national winner without knowing 
that other states would follow, as such a decision would only serve to 
diminish political power of the state.143 Simply put, a compacting state 
would not be able to get to the desired result of a nationwide popular 
vote without assurance that it would be joined by enough sister states 
in making the change so that the new method of allocation would be 
controlling at the Electoral College.144 Such behavior was exactly the 
kind that Justice White was concerned about in his U.S. Steel dissent, 
as he argued that under the Compact Clause, actions “that would 
be permissible for individual states to undertake are not permissible 
for a group of states to agree to undertake.”145 For states that desire a 
change to a national popular vote, the less risky option is to maintain 
the status quo (i.e., statewide popular election) so as not to diminish 
any political power.146 The dominant strategy, at least for states that 
prefer a change to a direct national vote, is to pledge its electors to 
the winner of the national popular vote.147 But because of the lack of 
assurance, states that want change reach an inefficient result.148 Thus, 
the triggering component149 of the NPVC provides the assurance that 
each signatory state can pursue the dominant strategy without having 
to hope that other potential signatory states entertain the same degree 
of selflessness in changing their method of allocation.150 If a court were 
to look only to this coordinated behavior among the signatory states 
and ignore any detrimental effects on non-signatories, such ignorance 
142 See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 209, 220 (2009) (for a helpful graphical explanation of assurance game strategy).
143 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College? 7 
Election L.J. 218, 224 (2008) (“The NPV[C] states need a compact only because no state wants to 
be altruistic all by itself.”).
144 Id. at 224 n.35 (“If a state adopted [the] NPV[C] by itself, it could prevent the ‘wrong’ winner 
from becoming president only when doing so is contrary to the state’s own internal preference. 
The nature of the problem thus requires more than one state to participate in the solution.”)
145 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 482 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
146 See McAdams, supra note 142.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
150 See McAdams, supra note 142, at 221. (“Everyone wants to keep their money in the bank if 
everyone else does, but wants to remove their money if enough others are going to remove 
theirs . . . [T]he inefficient equilibrium results when everyone seeks to avoid the risk of pooling and 
goes it alone.”)
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would presume that a Compact Clause inquiry is workable only by the 
narrowly defined U.S. Steel test.151
The NPVC is distinguishable from an arrangement in which the 
member states collectively merged and agreed that the voters within 
the block would determine the actual person who would win the elec-
tion, to the exclusion of the voting preferences of non-member states.152 
Even though the member states are collectively establishing an agree-
ment, they are still sharing power with non-member states because the 
member states are not consolidating their power.153 The situation would 
be different if the NPVC’s system tried to disenfranchise specific voters 
in states.154 If power can be transferred simply because the signatory 
states gang up and agree on the method they think is best for allocat-
ing, then the argument from the non-signatory states must be that the 
purpose behind their method of allocation must be realized when the 
Electoral College actually convenes.155 At best though, the NPVC only 
marginalizes the satisfaction of non-member state legislatures with the 
end product.156 In fact, the NPVC acknowledges and preserves the sig-
nificance of individual state elections because the actual maintenance 
of them is crucial in giving effect to the NPVC’s aims.157
A signatory state undoubtedly has the power to bind itself to a par-
ticular method of allocation, but might it be prevented from construc-
tively binding another state in the process?158 If, by random chance and 
without collusion, state legislatures decided to allocate their electors to 
the popular vote, no problem would be presented, yet the same result 
151 See Pincus, supra note 118, at 536 (finding merit to Justice White’s dissent in U.S. Steel and 
advocating that “[a] new judicial test should give some meaning to the text of the Constitution. 
Otherwise, the Compact Clause is reduced to a redundancy, serving to signify that the states 
cannot do collectively what they cannot do individually.”).
152 Hendricks, supra note 143 (explaining that NPVC member states “want to pledge their votes not 
to the winner within their own bloc but to the winner in the nation).
153 Id.
154 Cf. Derek Muller, More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A 
Response to Professor Hendricks, 7 Election L.J. 227, 232 (2008) (explaining that the NPVC shifts 
power to the signatory states because “it is the political power for a group of states to decide how 
electors should be appointed, as a collective group, to the exclusion of non-compacting states.”)
155 See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 834 (“The Constitution guarantees to the states the power to 
choose presidential electors, but it does not guarantee that a state’s presidential electors will have 
their candidate selected president.”).
156 Hendricks, supra note 143 (“Voters in every state would retain political power over the selection 
of the president.”).
157 Article III of the NPVC says that each member state will calculate the total number of votes that 
“have been cast in a statewide popular election and shall add such votes together to produce a 
‘national popular vote total’ for each presidential slate.” National Popular vote Compact, supra note 
8.
158 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because powers 
are reserved to the States ‘respectively,’ it is clear that no State may legislate for another State.”) See 
also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (explaining how states cannot exercise their Article II 
plenary power in a manner that violates another part of the Constitution).
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would occur.159 So the problem is in the manner in which the NPVC 
would be enacted, not its effect.160 The non-signatory states would have 
to argue that the second prong of the U.S. Steel test is broader than the 
facts of U.S. Steel allowed it to be and that any legislation that inflicts 
negative third party externalities can be used as an affirmative basis to 
show that legislation violates the Compact Clause.161 Under the NPVC, 
the negative externalities would be the disruption and nullification of a 
non-signatory’s power to give effect to its method of allocation.162 U.S. 
Steel seems to foreclose a non-signatory state from arguing that pecuni-
ary externalities are an affirmative defense under the second prong of 
the test, though it is not clear whether political externalities can be used as 
a defense.163 Thus, the Compact Clause, on its own, might not be enough 
to declare that a state’s reasonable expectations have been frustrated.164 A 
deeper analysis must define what those reasonable expectations are, and 
what constitutional guarantees apply to them, if any.
C. Does the Guarantee Clause have the answer?
A prima facie transfer of power under a Compact Clause analysis 
might be present, but only if a non-signatory state is entitled to giv-
ing effect to the protection of that power under another constitutional 
provision such as the Guarantee Clause.165 Article IV, section 4 of the 
Constitution declares that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”166 For purposes 
of the NPVC, the Guarantee Clause might help determine if the people 
in the non-signatory states are entitled to protections within their state 
that cannot be frustrated by what other states might do.167
159 See Amanda Rolat, Testimony of Amanda Rolat Before the Committee on Government Operations and 
the Environment of the Council of the District of Columbia Regarding the National Popular vote Plan, 
Brennan Center for Justice 7 (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/
Democracy/NPV_Testimony.pdf. See also, Hendricks, supra note 143, at 226.
160 U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 484 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“Judging by 
effect, not form, it is obvious that non-Compact States can be placed at a competitive disadvantage 
by the Multistate Tax Compact.”). 
161 Greve, supra note 81, at 335 (illustrating this scenario by the following analogy: “[This] is 
a lot like saying that a private firm need not fear price-fixing among its competitors because 
the competitors are permitted to take unilateral actions that might put the firm out of business 
anyway.”).
162 See Feeney, supra note 141.
163 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978) (“Moreover, it is not 
explained how any economic pressure that does exist is an affront to the sovereignty of nonmember 
States. Any time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the programs of a sister 
State, pressure to modify those programs may result.”) (emphases added). 
164 See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 835–42.
165 Id. at 835.
166 U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4.
167 See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 833–842.
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John Adams said he “never understood” the Guarantee Clause 
and “believe[d] no man ever did or will.”168 In the famous 1793 case of 
Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice Wilson articulated a “short definition” of a 
republican state, saying it required “that the Supreme Power resid[e] 
in the body of the people.”169 In the 1849 case of Luther v. Borden, Justice 
Taney concluded that only the political branch of the government 
could define what it meant to have a republican form of government.170 
In Luther, the Supreme Court held that the decision to recognize which 
of two Rhode Island governments was legitimate rested with Congress 
and not the courts, rendering the Guarantee Clause non-justiciable.171 
More than 100 years later in Baker v. Carr, the Court explained that a 
political question was “primarily a function of the separation of pow-
ers” and would only come up in instances pertaining to the judiciary’s 
relationship with other branches of the federal government “not of the 
federal judiciary’s relationship to the States.”172
Assuming the Guarantee Clause would even become justiciable 
in NPVC litigation, a litigant would have to show that non-signatory 
states would no longer be accountable to their respective electorates, 
at least not at the Electoral College.173 A non-signatory state would 
need to demonstrate that the method of allocation it has chosen can no 
longer be given effect, specifically because the enactment of the NPVC 
prevented that state from making an independent decision about 
its electors.174 A fair criticism of the NPVC is that it undermines the 
autonomy of non-signatory states in a similar manner to how the state 
of Maryland undermined federal autonomy by taxing the Bank of the 
United States.175 In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall held 
that even though Maryland was not forcing the federal government 
to adopt any particular legislation, the tax on the Bank infringed on 
a domain that was wholly within the federal government’s power.176 
Using McCulloch as a basis for saying how NPVC signatory states are 
horizontally disrupting a non-signatory state’s republican form of gov-
168 Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for A Third Century, 
88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (1988).
169 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793).
170 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
171 Id.
172 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily 
a function of the separation of powers.”).
173 See Rolat, supra note 159, at 7 (“Regardless of what other states may choose to do, every state 
remains free to appoint its own presidential electors however it sees fit, even if the NPV[C] 
compact were adopted. Nothing in the Guarantee Clause prohibits this arrangement.”).
174 Feeney, supra note 141, at 1448 (explaining that a distinction between the NPVC and a system in 
which states change their method of allocation to a proportional system revolves around whether 
“[the] states are still making their decisions independently and as states”). 
175 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 432 (1819). 
176 Id. at 436. 
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ernment is, at best, difficult to articulate, but could potentially come 
into play.177
One scholar argues that the NPVC would violate the Guarantee 
Clause because it “blurs important federal lines.”178 However, signa-
tory states already have the plenary power to blur state lines by acting 
without a compact, so the coordinated state action should not be dis-
positive of the NPVC’s constitutionality or lack thereof.179 The NPVC 
does not determine what method the non-compacting states decide to 
choose, as “it is still the prerogative of each state legislature to choose 
its own method.”180 Though individuals in non-signatory states might 
be disappointed in the result that follows from the NPVC’s enactment, 
their state legislatures will always have the means to decide how to 
appoint its electors.181 Simply put, “[b]eing in the minority does not 
mean that your vote is not counted; it just means that you lose.”182 Even 
in the context of state autonomy, the Guarantee Clause likely would not 
be invoked absent some federal constraint on non-signatory states.183
D. A State’s Plenary Article II Power in Property Lingo
Another method of articulating whether state sovereignty has been 
infringed by the NPVC is to analogize the coordinated state actions to 
property terms. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s framework 
of distinguishing property, liability, and inalienability rules184 can be 
helpful in determining if individual states can give up this power to 
a compact and if the non-signatory’s powers are infringed because of 
it. By vesting state legislatures with the plenary power to decide their 
respective state’s method of allocation, the Constitution has effectively 
given each state legislature an entitlement to that power.185 Under this 
theoretical analogy, a non-signatory state could try to counter this argu-
ment by saying that even though the allocation power is plenary within 
the individual states, the delegation of that power to an interstate com-
pact (or to anything else for that matter) inflicts negative externalities 
on the non-signatory states and thus requires congressional consent.186
177 See Feeney, supra note 141.
178 Id. at 1444. 
179 See Rolat, supra note 159.
180 See id.
181 Hendricks, supra note 143, at 226.
182 Id.
183 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, 
Majority Rule, and the Problem of the Denominator, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 754–55 (1994) (discussing 
the Guarantee Clause’s limits on federal restructuring of state governments).
184 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
view of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
185 Each state legislature has essentially been vested with a property right in deciding its method of 
allocation. Id. at 1092 (providing an overview of how entitlements operate).
186 Id. at 1111 (providing an illustration of how externalities operate).
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If a property rule applies to each state’s plenary power, then a given 
state legislature’s “entitlement” of choosing its preferred method of 
allocation cannot be taken away unless the legislature effectively gives 
it up.187 The state’s selected method of appointing electors would come 
with the full bundle of property rights—the most important of which 
would be the right to transfer. An NPVC signatory state legislature’s 
entitlement would even prevent citizens from within that state from 
claiming that the legislature has impermissibly delegated away their 
right to vote in a statewide-only form of election.188 Because citizens get 
the right to vote only as a result of state legislation, the state legislatures 
can compact around whatever existing voting rights those citizens may 
have previously been entitled to.189
If property rules govern a state legislature’s power in a particular 
area, then that power is inherent in a state’s sovereign powers under 
the Eleventh Amendment.190 If a liability rule applies to each state’s 
plenary power, then a non-signatory state legislature’s entitlement can 
be “taken” or, more appropriately, marginalized, so long as the body 
or thing infringing on that entitlement appropriately compensates that 
state’s legislature.191 If an inalienability rule applies, then a given state 
legislature’s entitlement simply cannot be bargained away.192 At the 
vertical dimension of federalism, if states have a property rule to pro-
tect their entitlements qua states, local autonomy benefits in the sense 
187 Id. at 1105 (“No one can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless the 
holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values the property.”).
188 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938) (holding 
that a compact to equitably apportion water rights on between Colorado and New Mexico on 
the La Plata River was binding upon a corporation that had been previously granted irrigation 
rights). Hinderlider is significant not for articulating any standard whereby a compact requires 
congressional consent, but for its explanation that a compact has the effect of binding private 
parties within a state, even if that state has previously granted rights in conflict with the provisions 
of the compact. Id. at 106. The Court’s opinion supports the proposition that in enacting a compact, 
a state, as an abstract political entity, might have greater rights than that of its citizens. Id. at 109. 
Furthermore, the Court said that the taking away of a vested right would require a burdensome 
showing by the private individual effected, requiring him to show a “vitiating infirmity” on the 
part of the state in making its decision to enter and enforce the compact. Id. at 108–09. 
189 For an articulation of this principle, see Ouellette v. International Paper Company, 666 F. Supp. 
58, 61 n.1 (D. Vt. 1987) (differentiating rights that are derivative from the state from those that are 
not).
190 For NPVC purposes, the question then becomes whether it is acceptable for a state to delegate 
its Article II powers in the same manner that it would waive sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“In deciding whether a 
State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver 
only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the 
text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” (quoting Murray v. Wilson 
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
191 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 184, at 1108–1110 (explaining how a property rule works).
192 Id. at 1111–1115 (explaining how an inalienability rule works).
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that local government can be more responsive to its constituents.193 
A state legislature loses bargaining power with its constituents if it 
is limited in its responsiveness to pressing concerns; this bargaining 
power is further decreased if an inalienability rule attaches to a state’s 
entitlement.194 Consequently, American federalism is better served if a 
property rule protects a state’s plenary Article II power.195
The seminal case that best illustrates this principle is New York v. 
United States, where the Supreme Court held that the state of New York 
could not consent to federal legislation that incentivized states to either 
comply with a federal directive or else face a penalty by “tak[ing] title” 
to radioactive waste within their states and incurring liability for any 
damages flowing from that waste.196 In examining this relationship of 
vertical federalism, the Court concluded that even though state officials 
might be incentivized to allow Congress to expand its powers beyond 
those enumerated in the Constitution, state officials were nevertheless 
prohibited from such acquiescence.197 More to the point, the Court 
explained that the New York state government could not consent to 
congressional enlargement of power because the federal structure set 
up by the Constitution was designed to protect individuals, not the 
states themselves. 198
Though the New York Court made this determination on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, it suggested that the outcome might be differ-
ent if the “take title” provision were composed by way of an interstate 
compact.199 Thus, a state power that would be inalienable if conveyed 
under the guise of federal commandeering might nevertheless be trans-
ferrable200 if done by way of an interstate compact.201 However, because 
each state’s plenary power is not a reserved power, but rather a positive 
193 Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in 
Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2010) (“[A] property rule approach 
would better serve the federalism values of local autonomy (locating decisional authority at the 
local level), interjurisdictional innovation (allowing for the diversity of response that engenders 
the federalism “laboratory of ideas”), and problem-solving synergy (fostering intergovernmental 
partnerships to cope with interjurisdictional problems)).” See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 458 (1991) (explaining how the federalism allows for greater government responsiveness).
194 See Ryan, supra note 193, at 13–14.
195 Id. at 14 (“A pro-bargaining property rule would be more consistent with the rest of the Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence, more faithful to the full panoply of values that undergird American 
federalism, and better for state and federal governance in the gray area.”).
196 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75, 182–83 (1992).
197 Id. at 182 (“The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the 
governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch 
or the States.”) (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 181.
199 Id. at 183 (“New York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact. Any estoppel 
implications that might flow from membership in a compact . . . thus do not concern us here.”)
200 A power might be transferrable if it is protected by a property rule.
201 See Ryan, supra note 193, at 88–89.
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grant of authority from the Constitution,202 New York would only sup-
port an attack on the NPVC for its general propositions of federalism. If 
a litigant used New York to explain how the NPVC is unconstitutional, a 
court would have decided whether the framers designed the Electoral 
College system for the benefit of individuals or for the protection of 
states.203 Those against the NPVC cannot argue that compacting states 
are giving up a power that the Constitution mandates they cannot 
give away.204 The Electoral College sets up a system that “encourages 
candidates to view states as distinct states, not simply masses of indi-
vidual voters.”205 However, no individual state has a right to disrupt 
the overall scheme of the Electoral College.206 Even though signatory 
state legislatures are arguably delegating their ability to pick electors 
to the fancies of the national will, such a delegation is permissible since 
each state is making an intelligible policy decision about how it wants 
to allocate electors.207 Regardless of what analogy is applied to a state’s 
plenary power, non-signatory states never had any power to choose 
electors other than that of their own state and cannot claim that the 
NPVC has stripped them of any “property right” in their decision on 
how to allocate electors.
E. In the Alternative: Withdrawal Concerns  
and the Lack of a Binding Mechanism
In potential NPVC litigation, another heavily debated issue within 
the second prong of the U.S. Steel test would be the potentially destruc-
tive nature of a signatory state’s unilateral withdrawal from the com-
pact.208 The U.S. Steel Court concluded that withdrawal capabilities of 
signatories was a highly relevant, but not dispositive, factor in con-
202 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam) (unanimous 
opinion) (“[T]he legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the 
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United State 
Constitution.”)
203 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“The Constitution does not protect 
the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political 
entities . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals.”)
204 Cf. Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879) (“No legislature can bargain away the 
public health or the public morals.”)
205 Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and its Meager Federalism, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 195, 225 (2004).
206 Id. (“[The Electoral College] does not give states themselves any right to exercise independent 
sovereignty.”). Bradley Smith thinks that “[t]he biggest federalism effect of the College may be 
simply to remind both candidates and voters of the role of states in our larger federal system.” 
Bradley A. Smith, vanity of vanities: National Popular vote and the Electoral College, 7 Elec. L. J. 196, 
206 (2008).
207 Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional 
Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 Geo. L.J. 
237, 254 n.79 (2011).
208 Williams, supra note 2, at 215–22.
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sidering whether an interstate agreement runs afoul of the Compact 
Clause.209 The concern with the NPVC’s self-imposed July 20th blackout 
date210 is that signatory state legislatures could be pressured to change 
their systems back to an allocation based only on statewide vote if an 
unfavorable outcome appears imminent.211 For example, if the NPVC 
had been enacted in 2004, Massachusetts’s Democratic legislature 
would have had to award its delegates to Republican George W. Bush, 
despite John Kerry’s overwhelming victory in the statewide vote.212 
Presumably though, signatory states, and the citizens within those states, 
have already conceded the possibility that their electors might have to 
cast votes adverse to the political will of their respective states.
The Supreme Court has also determined that once a state has signed 
on to a compact, it does not retain any independent authority to inter-
pret whether it can withdraw, as other member states will have built 
up a reliance interest in the process.213 In the nation’s early Compact 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court explained that a compact had the same 
effect as a contract, and thus a state could not impair its own contract 
by trying to pass laws that would alter or undermine it.214 Unless the 
terms of the compact allow for such an exit, a state may not terminate 
the agreement.215 Because a compact is an enforceable legal contract, a 
state’s withdrawal from a compact would effectively amount to state 
legislative action that impairs a contractual obligation, violating the 
Contract Clause of the Constitution.216
Non-signatory states could interfere with the NPVC by failing to 
comply with the Congressional safe harbor date for counting electoral 
votes217 and by eliminating a true “popular” vote altogether from their 
state.218 Specifically, a non-signatory state could vest the appointment of 
209 U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 457, 473 (1978). It is not crystal clear from the 
opinion whether the “withdrawal” factor is relevant only to the federal supremacy prong of the 
Compact Clause test or if it applies to the entire Compact Clause inquiry.
210 See supra note 10.
211 Williams, supra note 2, at 215.
212 Id.
213 West Virginia ex. Rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1950) (“[The compact] requires no elaborate 
argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those 
who alone have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final 
meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States.”). See also id. at 36 (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that because the other member states of the compact developed a reliance interest 
when West Virginia signed the compact, West Virginia should be estopped from exiting the 
compact). 
214 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1823) (“[A] State has no more power to impair an obligation 
into which she herself has entered, than she can the contracts of individuals.”).
215 The U.S. Steel Court found this feature to be explicitly covered by Article X of the Multistate Tax 
Compact. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 457 (1978).
216 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts . . . ”).
217 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2011).
218 Williams, supra note 2, at 209–15. 
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electors back to the state legislature, eliminating any popular vote tabu-
lation within that state and absolving all of its voters from figuring into 
the total votes that would be counted by the signatory states.219 While 
that type of action would be highly unlikely to occur, it would make a 
mockery of the NPVC, whose member states would count only those 
votes that were cast in a “statewide popular election.”220 The enactment 
of the NPVC might incentivize states to behave in such an irresponsible 
manner, but the discussion of such a problem is relevant only to the 
remedies of an untimely withdrawal, not whether the Compact Clause 
has itself been violated. Moreover, as Congress has Article II authority 
to handle some of the housekeeping measures of the Electoral College, 
it could pass a statute that requires states to set a reasonable time for 
changing its method of allocation once one has been selected.221
NPVC proponents might run into trouble under that criterion, 
considering the compact’s July 20th deadline for compacting states 
to withdraw in an election year if the NPVC is in effect.222 This self-
imposed blackout date was not contemplated in the Amar brothers’ 
original plan, with the two professors even going so far as to rely on a 
state’s ability to withdraw from the compact as being a significant rea-
son for why the compact would not require congressional consent.223 
However, wiggle room could be in the level of generality applied to the 
term “withdrawal.” Signatory states could argue that even though they 
cannot withdraw as states past the July 20th blackout date, the electors 
from states that do not have binding statutory provisions maintain per-
sonal voting discretion and thus individually retain withdrawal power 
on behalf of the state.
The diminished significance of electors was acknowledged not long 
after the introduction of political parties.224 Faithless electors are rare, 
and no “well-understood rules” govern their conduct.225 On a strict 
reading of the NPVC, one might conclude that the legislation effec-
tively does nothing to bind electors, as it imposes a mandate only on 
state legislatures.226 Consequently, in order for these electors in signa-
tory states to be bound, a court would have to explicitly acknowl-
edge that the meeting of the electors is a mere formality. If a court 
219 Id. at 215–16. 
220 See National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
221 Amar, supra note 225, at 261 n.80.
222 See National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
223 Amar & Amar, supra note 3. (“[E]ach state would retain complete unilateral freedom to switch 
back to its older system for any future election, and the coordinated law creates no new interstate 
governmental apparatus.”).
224 See 1 Thomas Benton, Thirty Years’ View; Or A History Of The Working Of The American 
Government For Thirty Years, From 1820 To 1850 37 (D. Appleton & Co. 1854).
225 Bennett, supra note 53, at 121 (explaining that no rules actually explain an elector’s obligation, 
but that some statutes acknowledge the existence of some kind of obligation).
226 See National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8.
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determined that electors maintain their independent voting discre-
tion at the Electoral College,227 the NPVC could potentially certify 
faithless electors, allowing signatory states to pressure electors into 
“withdrawing” for them.
Though the Supreme Court has not made a definitive holding on 
the roles of electors at the Electoral College, it held in Ray v. Blair that 
the Chairman of the Alabama Executive Committee of the Democratic 
Party could refuse to certify an elector who refused to pledge his sup-
port to the eventual Democratic candidate for president.228 The Ray dis-
sent thought that by allowing the party chairman to refuse certification, 
the majority had “elevate[d] the perversion of the forefathers’ plan 
into a constitutional principle.”229 The Court did not reach the issue of 
whether an elector has a constitutional obligation to vote for the party 
he or she is pledged to, merely saying that the Twelfth Amendment 
did not serve as a bar to a political party’s requirement that a pledge 
vote for the party’s eventual national nominee.230 Significantly, for 
NPVC purposes, the Ray Court never explained what would happen 
if an elector chose to violate his pledge.231 Even if an elector were to 
be enjoined from voting for a particular candidate but did so anyway, 
the subsequent legal proceedings might affect that elector individually, 
yet still be of no consequence to the Electoral College.232 The faithless 
elector could run away with his vote even if the political party he was 
pledged to vote in accordance with sought to enjoin him.
A layer of delegates in-between the people and the actual casting 
of votes was initially viewed as both as important to both the preserva-
tion of the country’s republican structure and the fear that the swaying 
power of educated men would result in the public making poor choic-
es.233 The Electoral College was introduced to its first faithless elector 
in 1796, when Pennsylvania delegate Samuel Miles, who was expected 
to cast his vote for John Adams, broke with his expected Federalist 
227 The NPVC’s text does not suggest otherwise. As a baseline for defining the roles of electors, 
NPVC supporters could look back to original interpretations. See The Federalist No. 68, supra note 
48, at 410-13.
228 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–231 (1952). The Court had briefly mentioned the roles of electors 
62 years earlier, but did not address the issue of an elector’s obligation to the party he is pledged 
to. Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“The sole function of the presidential electors is to 
cast, certify, and transmit the vote of the state for president and vice-president of the nation.”).
229 Ray, 343 U.S. at 234 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It may be 
admitted that this law does no more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary 
general practice.”)
230 See id. at 231 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
231 James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over Presidential
Elections, 27 L. & Contemp. Problems 495, 509 (1962). 
232 Id. 
233 Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular vote, 12 J.L. & Pol. 665, 
676 (1996). See also Madison, supra note 15.
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endorsement and placed his vote for Thomas Jefferson.234 Some state 
courts have also acknowledged the practical responsibilities of electors 
yet refrained from imposing any responsibility on the electors absent a 
legislative mandate.235 Other state courts have recognized a delegate’s 
legal duty to carry out his vote in accordance with the party he is 
nominated to.236 Older cases seem to weigh a balancing of the mere 
formality proposition, but ultimately conclude that state law cannot 
fetter an elector’s discretion to vote as he so chooses.237 The problem is 
hardly a current one, and the diminished significance of electors was 
acknowledged not long after the introduction of political parties.238 
While often never considered by the voting public, the possibility 
and awareness of faithless electors is quite real.239 As recently as 2000, 
George W. Bush’s campaign team was considering potential strate-
gies on how to persuade delegates to change their votes from Gore 
to Bush in the event that Gore won the Electoral College and Bush 
won the popular vote.240 Prior to Election Day, the Bush campaign 
was planning a media blitz in which it would prepare “talking points 
about the Electoral College’s essential unfairness,” trying to pressure 
Gore delegates to switch their votes.241
At least twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted some form of statute that binds pledged delegates to vote for 
234 Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 36. The United States Gazette later quoted a Federalist as 
saying, “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas 
Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think.” Id.
235 See, e.g., Wallace v. Thornton, 162 S.E.2d 273, 275 (S.C. 1968) (“Theoretically, the electors go to 
the electoral college and exercise an independent judgment in choosing a President. In actuality 
they go committed to vote for a certain candidate.”).
236 E.g., Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P. 1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (“They are in effect no more than 
messengers whose sole duty it is to certify and transmit the election returns.”); Thomas v. Cohen, 
262 N.Y.S. 320, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933) (“[T]he trust that was originally conferred upon the electors 
by the people, to express their will by the selections they make, has, over these many years, 
ripened into a bounden duty -- as binding upon them as if it were written into the organic law.”). 
See also State v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 163 (Neb. 1912). 
237 See, e.g., Bridenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (Kan. 1896) (finding no legal obligation for 
electors to vote for any particular candidate and concluding that neither the secretary of state nor 
the courts can interfere with an elector’s discretion).
238 See Benton, supra note 224. 
239 See Bennett, supra note 53, at 122.
240 Michael Kramer, Bush Set to Fight An Electoral College Loss, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2000), http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2000-11-01/news/18145743_1_electoral-votes-popular-vote-bush-aide. 
241 Id.
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the candidate that they have been pledged to.242 Two NPVC signatory 
states, Illinois and New Jersey, have not enacted any such statutes.243 
Some states impose financial244 or criminal245 penalties for failure to 
vote in accordance with the party that nominated the elector. Some 
states even see a benefit in maintaining elector discretion in the event 
that a candidate dies between Election Day and the date the Electoral 
College vote is set for. For example, Wisconsin and Tennessee bind their 
electors to vote in accordance with the party that nominated them to 
be delegates, but if the candidate to whom those delegates are pledged 
has died before the Electoral College convenes, then those delegates 
retain electoral discretion.246 The flexibility that flows from the mainte-
nance of elector discretion allows the avoidance of House contingency 
elections in the event that independent candidates prevent any one 
candidate from receiving a majority of votes and the election of win-
ning candidates who are later found to be “totalitarian or corrupt.”247 
South Carolina, for example, allows for a party to relieve an elector of 
his pledge if in the party’s opinion, “it would not be in the best interest 
of the State for the elector to cast his ballot for such a candidate.”248
For purposes of a Compact Clause analysis, the determination of 
the electors’ roles is crucial, particularly when considering the NPVC 
from an ex ante perspective. When viewed ex post, the NPVC looks 
unconstitutional, as the exact effect contemplated by those who argue 
against the NPVC does, in fact, occur. That is, pledged delegates vote 
for the winner of the national popular vote, the winner of that vote 
becomes president, and the non-signatory states will have had no say 
242 Ala. Code § 17-14-31 (West 2011); Alaska Stat. § 15.30.090 (2011); Cal. Elec. Code § 6906 (West 
2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-4-304(5) (West 2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-176 (West 2011); 
Del. Code Ann., tit. 15, § 4303(b) (West 2011); D.C. Code § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (West 2010); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 103.021(1) (West 2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 14-28 (West 2011); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, 
§ 805(2) (West 2010); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-505(c) (West 2011); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 168.47 (West 2011); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-785 (West 2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-104(c) 
(West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, § 8 (West 2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-714, 298.050 (West 
2011); N.M. Stat. § 1-15-9 (West 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-212 (West 2011); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3505.40 (West 2011); Okla. Stat. tit 26, § 26-10-102 (West 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 248.355(2); 
S.C. Code. Ann. § 7-19-80 (West 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-15-104(c) (West 2011); Utah Code 
Ann. § 20A-13-304 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 17, § 2732 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-
203 (West 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29A.56.320 (West 2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75(2) (West 
2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-19-108 (West 2011).
243 See 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 20 (West 2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011). Neither of 
these statutes makes any mention of binding electors. 
244 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163-212 (West 2011) (requiring that delegates pay a $500 fine if 
they vote for a candidate in a party that he was not nominated by).
245 See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-9(B) (West 2011) (“Any presidential elector who casts his ballot 
in violation of the provisions contained in Subsection A of this section is guilty of a fourth degree 
felony.”).
246 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75(2) (West 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-15-104 (West 2011). 
247 Ross & Josephson. supra note 233.
248 S.C. Code Ann. § 7-19-80 (West) (2010).
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in deciding how the president should be determined.249 However, when 
viewed ex ante, the NPVC’s text appears to be doing something far dif-
ferent, as it has no binding mechanism on the actual electors, but only 
on the state legislatures.250 In the New Jersey Assembly Appropriations 
Committee’s Statement that follows that state’s version of the NPVC, 
the legislature presumes that the bill “requires” electors from signa-
tory states to vote for the national popular vote winner.251 However, 
the bill’s text itself does not provide for any penalties if electors choose 
to vote differently.252 Any binding mechanism on the actual electors 
comes from the state enforcement statutes, and likely would survive 
federal preemption.253
As the Ray Court made clear, neither the Constitution nor any fed-
eral statute mandates that the electors vote for the candidate whom 
they are pledged for.254 Only custom has made such the practice.255 
Thus, under an ex ante framing of the NPVC, the agreement to allocate 
electors in a uniform manner only gives the signatory states a chance 
to control the Electoral College, not a definitive guarantee that they 
will control it.256 However, if all the signatory states subsequently adopt 
criminal penalties or other statutes that bind the electors, then the ex 
ante perspective might not have as much bite.257 While the NPVC as a 
whole might be ripe for a court to evaluate prior to an election,258 the 
constitutionality of a pledged delegate’s lack of adherence to the NPVC 
and/or state enforcement statutes might present different questions 
249 See Muller, supra note 80. 
250 National Popular vote Compact, supra note 8 (“The presidential elector certifying official of each 
member state shall certify the appointment in that official’s own state of the elector slate nominated 
in that state in association with the national popular vote winner.”) (emphasis added).
251 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011).
252 Id.
253 State enforcement statutes likely would not be preempted since the NPVC does not govern the 
conduct of electors, even though it would have the force of federal law. See supra note 69. 
254 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952).
255 Id. at 228–30.
256 Even with such a framing of the NPVC, it would still nonetheless be regarded as a compact, 
and supporters would likely be wasting time trying to argue that the NPVC should not even be 
evaluated under the Compact Clause. See, e.g., Breest v. Moran, 571 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.R.I. 1983) 
(“[N]ot every agreement between the states (howsoever entitled) is a ‘compact’ within the meaning 
and intendment of the Compact Clause.”).
257 Even at this point, the electors would not necessarily be bound to vote for the particular 
candidate, but rather would only suffer penalties if they chose to cast their vote for another 
candidate. In the event that an elector broke the law, the Constitution is silent on whether his or 
her vote would still count. See Benton, supra note 224, at 115 (“The Constitution requires that 
a candidate receive a majority of the votes of “appointed” electors in order to avoid the House 
selection procedure, and a faithless elector could then deprive a candidate of the necessary 
majority and throw the process into the House.”).
258 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (discussing the “ripeness 
doctrine.”).
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either independent of the NPVC or determinative of the NPVC’s 
constitutionality.259
Under this “lack of a binding mechanism” argument, the strongest 
line of support for the NPVC is that while it is not airtight in all of the 
possible areas of constitutional analysis, it can survive on the grounds 
that it is not asking for its pledged electors to do anything more than 
they are constitutionally permitted (and, arguably, mandated) to do. 
As the Constitution is silent on the roles of the electors themselves, the 
precise moment that a transfer of power occurs under the second prong 
of the Compact Clause will not be clear until after a candidate has been 
officially elected.260
Conclusion
In short, assessing the constitutionality of the NPVC is a difficult 
exercise. Not only are the controlling precedents arcane and outdated, 
but the applicable constitutional provisions and principles are also 
dense and difficult to articulate.
The Compact Clause presents a number of hurdles for both sup-
porters and detractors of the NPVC. The most difficult component 
of a Compact Clause inquiry is defining what power, if any, is being 
infringed on.261 That exercise calls for the analysis of deep philosophi-
cal questions of the rights that come with state sovereignty, making it 
challenging to ascertain whether, or even if, the NPVC runs afoul of 
the many principles of federalism that have already been established. 
While the Compact Clause will likely be at the center of the debate 
if the constitutionality of the NPVC is ever presented to a court, the 
NPVC can pass constitutional muster even if it encroaches on the sov-
ereignty of non-member states. Because the role of electors has yet to 
be defined by a court, those electors retain independent withdrawal 
power on behalf of compacting states.
The irony of the NPVC debate is that when enacted, the NPVC 
would have little substantive change on the end result of who gets 
elected.262 The change, if any, would likely come in campaign strategy, 
as population centers, rather than swing states, will become the new 
targets of campaign stops. The political ramifications of the NPVC, 
though only tangentially related to an assessment of its constitution-
259 See Benton, supra note 224., at 115 (“Courts only grapple with interpretational problems after 
controversy has gelled and a lawsuit has been filed. In the case of a faithless electoral vote that 
seems to change the outcome of a presidential election, that will be awfully late in the game.”).
260 See Muller, supra note 80.
261 See supra, Part IV. C-E. 
262 While candidates might campaign differently with the enactment of the NPVC, the actual vote 
totals probably would not change significantly. See Brian P. Janiskee, “The Multiplier Effect,” 
http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.376/pub_detail.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) 
(explaining how the national vote usually tracks the Electoral College vote). 
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ality, would undoubtedly figure into the Supreme Court’s calculus, 
should a case about the NPVC ever get that far. Regardless of what 
comes of NPVC litigation, constitutional scrutiny of it is a healthy 
exercise for the country, allowing scholars to focus on the merits of 
seldom-discussed constitutional clauses, the roles of electors, and the 
purposes of the Electoral College.
